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Social Democracy and Social Science
To begin, I would like to thank Tim Bale, Jeremy Gilbert, and Stephen Meredith for their engagement with my work. It is always a pleasure to respond to such thoughtful criticisms. I am also delighted to be reminded of the number and variety of scholars for whom the issues I address are compelling. Those issues can be stated briefly. I wanted to offer a critical interpretation of New Labour and the traditions of social science on which it draws. And I wanted to point to desirable and plausible alternatives -an interpretive social science and a pluralist and dialogic politics.
New Labour
What is New Labour? I argue that New Labour is a social democratic response to issues highlighted by the New Right, where the issues are conceived in ways indebted to communitarianism and new institutionalism. Bale, Gilbert, and Meredith do not so much reject this view as suggest that it is remarkably close to New Labour's self-understanding, perhaps precisely because it emphasises the place of social science in New Labour rather than addressing questions about power. I want to reply by asking more generally about the place ascribed by interpretive social science to actors' self-understandings and to power. The kind of interpretive social science I favour explores social life in terms of its surface meanings rather than by appeals to deep structures. In this view, to explain New Labour we have to point to the changing meanings or beliefs of its architects. However, while an adequate interpretation of New Labour has to invoke the meanings or beliefs of its elite, it does not have to accept their assessment of the truth of those beliefs. I accept neither their view of the modernity to which they are responding nor the validity of their response. To the contrary, I trace their beliefs historically to particular traditions (eg. new institutionalism and communitarianism) to exhibit their contingency and partiality.
And I offer historical and philosophical critiques of these traditions to show that the elite of New Labour is wrong in its view of the modernity to which it is responding, and so in its chosen response. Alas, Gilbert and Bale object respectively to my emphasising the particular traditions I do and to my critique of these traditions. Let me turn, then, to their objections.
(ii) What role does social science play in New Labour's ideas and policies?
Gilbert regards my focus on social science as narrow. I do not have the space here to provide evidence of the role of social science within New Labour's ideas and policies. However, I can discuss the general claim that a focus on social science is narrow.
The recent upsurge of interest in the history of the human sciences owes much to the insight -associated above all with Michel Foucault -that no matter how we assess the truth of scientific knowledge, it is the source of practices and techniques that come to govern and discipline large parts of our lives. This insight suggests that a focus on social science need not be a narrow concern with stuff that goes on in universities. Such a focus can be an attempt to unravel the genealogy of the practices, policies, and techniques by which we are governed. So, for example, I go on from a study of the history of the new institutionalism to discuss how it made possible New Labour's promotion of networks, partnerships, and joined-up governance in the public sector. Hence it increasingly adopts cultural modes of analysis and the first concept of power.
On the other, it still gestures toward the second concept of power, typically by way of a nostalgic invocation of "capitalism". It hints at social relations within which people have interests that are at least partly apart from all traditions. It does so by appealing to such interests -or the structures from which they are implicitly derived -to explain the dominance of a particular discourse. The discourse is explained by its congruence with the interests of a group that oppresses others.
Gilbert certainly seems to want me to explain why New Labour drew on new institutionalism by referring not to contingent traditions, but to the restructuring of capitalism. Bale suggests I go awry in attributing such theoretical commitments to social scientists. He argues that social scientists are inspired by "mundane instrumentality". On one level I accept his view. No doubt social scientists often use one approach here and another there in the belief that they are the best tools for particular tasks. But, on another level, we should not allow their lack of awareness of the theoretical commitments lurking in the approaches they adopt to obscure the fact that these commitments do indeed lurk there. They (and perhaps Bale himself) seem to assume that we can make theory-neutral judgements about which tool is best for any given task. However, this assumption itself presupposes a naïve empiricist theory, according to which tasks and tools are simply given to people rather than being already constructed in part by their prior theories.
Such empiricism might add to its repertoire of approaches the interpretive one I favour; but it could not offer philosophical or historical analyses of various approaches to social science, for if it did, it would expose their theoretical incompatibility and their contingency and contestability. So, Bale is able to laud ethnography and history as ways of getting at New Labour -even to suggest my endeavours are a suggestive beginning to a fuller process of "soaking and poking"; but he is manifestly troubled by attempts to relate the texts and actions of New Labour and social scientists to traditions characterised by specific theoretical commitments. 3 It is true that I want to expose theoretical assumptions in various types of social science. It is also true that when we expose such assumptions, we associate social scientists with various theories that often take us away from their empirical accounts of government. But what is wrong with such theoretical analyses? The only alternative would seem to be an acceptance of the possibility of a theory-free social science that uses a range of theoretically neutral techniques to explore a given empirical domain.
What I am after, in contrast, is empirical studies informed by an interpretive approach. New Labour: A Critique tries to provide such a study of New Labour in government. It is not a complete study of all facets of New Labour. Hence I entirely agree with Bale and also Gilbert when they call for similar studies of other aspects of New Labour. We could do with interpretive studies of New Labour in relation to party members, think-tanks, policy communities, and international agencies. Governments look to such social science for technocratic solutions. The state promotes such social science through the policies that govern academic research. And there is little sign any of that will change. Let me clarify my view on the role of social movements. Social movements are useful but insufficient for realising a democratic alternative. They are insufficient because as long as we have a democratic polity the alternative will need to be supported by a political party or group in some kind of assembly; at some point a social movement must work through a political party or turn itself into a political party. In my view, then, people who participate in social movements are withdrawing from politics -or rather democratic politics -only in so far as they do so without acknowledging the need to engage a political party at some point. Gilbert encourages us to find such an answer in Finlayson's work (which I regret was published too late for me to refer to in my book). Although Finlayson offers a fine cultural analysis of New Labour, it is notable that ultimately he wants to explain the content he ascribes to it not by a historical narrative that reveals its contingency but by suggesting it is -in a sense which, given his emphasis on culture remains vague, even little more than a residual gesture toward an elder Marxism -a "reflection" of "contemporary capitalism". I hope that by explaining that I am arguing only that social movements are insufficient (not useless), I make it clear that I do not regard all participation in them as a withdrawal from politics, so I do not take "politics" to refer exclusively to party politics as distinct from social movements and cultural practices.
